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Abstract—In this paper we introduce a new digital image
forensics approach called forensic similarity, which determines
whether two image patches contain the same forensic trace
or different forensic traces. One benefit of this approach is
that prior knowledge, e.g. training samples, of a forensic trace
are not required to make a forensic similarity decision on
it in the future. To do this, we propose a two part deep-
learning system composed of a CNN-based feature extractor
and a three-layer neural network, called the similarity network.
This system maps pairs of image patches to a score indicating
whether they contain the same or different forensic traces. We
evaluated system accuracy of determining whether two image
patches were 1) captured by the same or different camera model,
2) manipulated by the same or different editing operation, and
3) manipulated by the same or different manipulation parameter,
given a particular editing operation. Experiments demonstrate
applicability to a variety of forensic traces, and importantly show
efficacy on “unknown” forensic traces that were not used to train
the system. Experiments also show that the proposed system
significantly improves upon prior art, reducing error rates by
more than half. Furthermore, we demonstrated the utility of the
forensic similarity approach in two practical applications: forgery
detection and localization, and database consistency verification.
Index Terms—Multimedia Forensics, Deep Learning, Forgery
Detection
I. INTRODUCTION
TRUSTWORTHY multimedia content is important to anumber of institutions in today’s society, including news
outlets, courts of law, police investigations, intelligence agen-
cies, and social media websites. As a result, multimedia
forensics approaches have been developed to expose tampered
images, determine important information about the processing
history of images, and identify details about the camera
make, model, and device that captured them. These forensic
approaches operate by detecting the visually imperceptible
traces, or “fingerprints,” that are intrinsically introduced by
a particular processing operation [1].
Recently, researchers have developed deep learning
methods that target digital image forensic tasks with high
accuracy. For example, convolutional neural network (CNN)
based systems have been proposed that accurately detect
traces of median filtering [2], resizing [3], [4], inpainting [5],
multiple processing operations [6]–[8], processing order [9],
and double JPEG compression [10], [11]. Additionally,
researchers have proposed approaches to identify the source
camera model of digital images [12]–[15], and identify their
origin social media website [16].
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However, there are two main drawbacks to many of these
existing approaches. First is that many deep learning systems
assume a closed set of forensic traces, i.e. known and closed
set of possible editing operations or camera models. That
is, these methods require prior training examples from a
particular forensic trace, such as the source camera model
or editing operation, in order to identify it again in the
future. This requirement is a significant problem for forensic
analysts, since they are often presented with new or previously
unseen forensic traces. Additionally, it is often not feasible
to scale deep learning systems to contain the large numbers
of classes that a forensic investigator may encounter. For
example, systems that identify the source camera model of
an image often require hundreds of scene-diverse images per
camera model for training [13]. To scale such a system to
contain hundreds or thousands of camera models requires a
prohibitively large data collection undertaking.
A second drawback of these existing approaches is that
many forensic investigations do not require explicit identifica-
tion of a particular forensic trace. For example, when analyzing
a splicing forgery, which is a composite of content from
multiple images, it is often sufficient to simply detect a region
of an image that was captured by a different source camera
model, without explicitly identifying that source. That is, the
investigator does not need to determine the exact processing
applied to the image, or the true sources of the pasted content,
just that an inconsistency exists within the image. In another
example, when verifying the consistency of an image database,
the investigator does not need to explicitly identify which
camera models were used to capture the database, just that
only one camera model or many camera models were used.
Recently, researchers have proposed CNN-based forensic
systems for digital images that do not require a closed and
known set of forensic traces. Research in [17] proposed a
system to output a binary decision indicating whether an image
was captured by a camera model used for training, or from an
unknown camera model that was not used in training. Research
in [18] showed that features learned by a CNN for source
camera model identification can be iteratively clustered to
identify spliced images. In addition, other CNN-based methods
have been proposed for forgery localization [19]–[21]. The
authors showed that these type systems can detect spliced
images even when the camera models were not used to train
the system.
In this paper, we propose a new digital image forensics
approach that operates on an open set of forensic traces.
This approach, which we call forensic similarity, determines
whether two image patches contain the same or different
Code and pre-trained CNNs for this project are available at
gitlab.com/MISLgit/forensic-similarity-for-digital-images and our laboratory
website misl.ece.drexel.edu/downloads/.
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2forensic traces. This approach is different from other forensics
approaches in that it does not explicitly identify the particular
forensic traces contained in an image patch, just whether they
are consistent across two image patches. The benefit of this
approach is that prior knowledge of a particular forensic trace
is not required to make a similarity decision on it.
To do this, we propose a two part deep learning system.
In the first part, called the feature extractor, we use a CNN
to extract general low-dimensional forensic features, called
deep features, from an image patch. Prior research has shown
that CNNs can be trained to map image patches onto a low-
dimensional feature space that encodes general and high-level
forensic information about that patch [3], [14], [17], [18], [22],
[23]. Next, we use a three layer neural network to map pairs
of these deep features onto a similarity score, which indicates
whether the two image patches contain the same forensic trace
or different forensic traces.
We experimentally evaluate the efficacy of our proposed
approach in several scenarios. We evaluate the performance
of our proposed forensic similarity system at determining
whether two image patches were 1) captured by the same or
different camera model, 2) manipulated the same or differ-
ent editing operation, and 3) manipulated same or different
manipulation parameter, given a particular editing operation.
Importantly, we evaluate performance on camera models,
manipulations and manipulation parameters not used during
training, demonstrating that this approach is effective in open-
set scenarios.
Furthermore, we demonstrate the utility of this approach
in two practical applications that a forensic analyst may
encounter. In the first application, we demonstrate that our
forensic similarity system detects and localizes image forg-
eries. Since image forgeries are often a composite of content
captured by two camera models, these forgeries are exposed
by detecting the image regions that are forensically dissimilar
to the host image. In the second application, we show that
the forensic similarity system verifies whether a database of
images was captured by all the same camera model, or by
different camera models. This is useful for flagging social
media accounts that violate copyright protections by stealing
content, often from many different sources.
This paper is an extension of our earlier work in [22]. In
our previous work, we proposed a proof-of-concept similarity
system for comparing the source camera model of two image
patches and evaluated on a limited set of camera models.
This system consisted of a pair of CNNs in a “Siamese”
configuration, and a shallow neural network. In this work,
we extend our previous work [22] in several ways. First, we
reframe the approach as a general system that is applicable
to any measurable forensic trace, such as manipulation type
or editing parameter, not just source camera model. Second,
we significantly improve the system architecture and training
procedure. We show these improvements lead to an over 50%
reduction classification error for camera model comparisons
relative to the method described in [22]. Among several
changes, significant improvements are due to the utilization of
full RGB color images, instead of relying soley on the green
color channel, as well as allowing the entire network to update
Fig. 1. Forensic similarity system overview.
in the secondary learning phase. Finally, we experimentally
evaluate our proposed approach in an vastly expanded range of
scenarios, and demonstrate utility in two practical applications.
In addition to our prior work in [22], other researchers
have utilized Siamese network configurations for multime-
dia forensics. Research in [20] and [19] proposes an image
transformation system that extracts a noise residual map,
called the “Noiseprint,” induced by camera model processes.
During training, pairs of extracted residual maps from the
same camera model and image position are encouraged to have
small pixel-by-pixel Euclidean distances. Unlike our proposed
system, their approach inputs a single image and outputs a
noise residual map, and then searches this map for forgery
related inconsistencies.
In other research [21], a CNN in Siamese configuration is
trained with pairs of image patches and labels associated with
EXIF header information of an image. Their approach pro-
duces a “self-consistency” heatmap, which highlights image
regions that have undergone forgery [21]. They show state-of-
the-art forgery detection and localization results. In Sec. V-A,
we compare against their approach for forgery detection.
The remaining parts of the manuscript are outlined as
follows. In Sec. II, we motivate and formalize the concept of
forensic similarity. In Sec. III, we detail our proposed deep-
learning system implementation and training procedure. In
this section, we describe how to build and train the CNN-
based feature extractor and similarity network. In Sec. IV,
we evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed approach in a
number of forensic situations, and importantly effectiveness on
unknown forensic traces. Finally, in Sec. V, we demonstrate
the utility of this approach in two practical applications.
II. FORENSIC SIMILARITY
Prior multimedia forensics approaches for digital images
have focused on identifying or classifying a particular forensic
trace (e.g. source camera model, processing history) in an
image or image patch. These approaches, however, suffer
from two major drawbacks in that 1) training samples from
a particular trace are required to identify it, and 2) not all
forensic analyses require identification of a trace. For example,
to expose a splicing forgery it is sufficient to identify that
the forged image is simply composite content from different
sources, without needing to explicitly identify those sources.
In this paper, we propose a new general approach that
addresses these drawbacks. We call this approach forensic
similarity. Forensic similarity is an approach that determines
if two image patches have the same or different forensic
trace. Unlike prior forensic approaches, it does not identify
a particular trace, but still provides important forensic
information to an investigator. The main benefit of this type
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Fig. 2. Camera-model based forensic similarity scores measured between random pairings of patches from the reference image (a), captured by a Google
Pixel 1 smartphone rear-facing camera, and from (b) a different Google Pixel 1 image or (c) a Asus Zenfone 3 image of the same scene as the reference
image. The histogram (d) shows the distribution of these forensic similarity scores. Forensic similarity between patches from the two Google Pixel images is
high, even though the two images depict different scenes and content, and were captured in different lighting environments. The forensic similarity between
patches from the Google Pixel and Asus Zenfone cameras is low, even though the two images depict similar content.
of approach is that it is able to be practically implemented in
open-set scenarios. That is, a forensic similarity based system
does not inherently require training samples from a forensic
trace in order to make a forensic similarity decision. Later, in
Sec. III, we describe how this approach is implemented using
a CNN-based deep learning system.
In this work, we define a forensic trace to be a signal embed-
ded in an image that is induced by, and captures information
about, a particular signal processing operation performed on
the image. Forensic traces are inherently unrelated to the
perceptual content of the image; two images depicting different
scenes may contain similar forensic traces, and two images
depicting similar scenes may contain different forensic traces.
Common mechanisms that induce a forensic trace in an image
are: the camera model that captured the image, the social
media website where the image was downloaded from, and
the processing history of the image. A number of approaches
have been researched to extract and identify the forensic traces
related to these mechanisms [7], [14], [24].
These prior approaches, however, assume a closed set of
forensic traces. They are designed to perform a mapping
X→ Y where X is the space of image patches and Y is
the space of known forensic traces that are used to train the
system, e.g. camera models or editing operations. However
when an input image patch has a forensic trace y /∈ Y,
the identification system is still forced to map to the space
Y, leading to an erroneous result. That is, the system will
misclassify this new “unknown” trace as a “known” one in Y.
This is problematic since in practice forensic investigators
are often presented with images or image patches that contain a
forensic trace for which the investigator does not have training
examples. We call these unknown forensic traces. This may
be a camera model that does not exist in the investigator’s
database, or previously unknown editing operation. In these
scenarios, it is still important to glean important forensic about
the image or image patch.
To address this, we propose a system that is capable of
operating on unknown forensic traces. Instead of building
a system to identify a particular forensic trace, we ask the
question “do these two image patches contain the same
forensic trace?” Even though the forensic similarity system
may have never seen a particular forensic trace before, it is
still able to distinguish whether they are the same or different
across two patches. This type of question is analogous to the
content-based image retrieval problem [25], and the speaker
verification problem [26].
We define forensic similarity as the function
C : X× X→ {0, 1} , (1)
that compares two image patches. This is done by mapping
two input image patches X1, X2 ∈ X to a score indicating
whether the two image patches have the same or different
forensic trace. A score of 0 indicates the two image patches
contain different forensic traces, and a score of 1 indicates
they contain the same forensic trace. In other words
C(X1, X2) =
{
0 if X1, X2 diff. forensic traces,
1 if X1, X2 same forensic trace.
(2)
To construct this system, we propose a forensic similarity
system consisting of two main conceptual parts, which are
shown in the system overview in Fig. 1. The first conceptual
part is called the feature extractor
f : X→ RN , (3)
which maps an input image patch X to a real valued N-
dimensional feature space. This feature space encodes high-
level forensic information about the image patch X . Recent
research in multimedia forensics has shown that convolutional
neural networks (CNNs) are powerful tools for extracting gen-
eral, high-level forensic information from image patches [23].
We specify how this is done in Sec. III, where we describe our
proposed implementation of the forensic similarity system.
Next we define the second conceptual part, the similarity
function
S : RN × RN → [0, 1] , (4)
that maps pairs of forensic feature vectors to a similarity score
that takes values from 0 to 1. A low similarity score indicates
that the two image patches X1 and X2 have dissimilar forensic
traces, and a high similarity score indicates that the two
forensic traces are highly similar.
4Finally, we compare the similarity score S(f(X1), f(X2))
of two image patches X1 and X2 to a threshold η such that
C(X1, X2) =
{
0 if S(f(X1), f(X2)) ≤ η
1 if S(f(X1), f(X2)) > η
. (5)
In other words, the proposed forensic similarity system takes
two image patches X1 and X2 as input. A feature extractor
maps these two input image patches to a pair of feature vectors
f(X1) and f(X2), which encode high-level forensic informa-
tion about the image patches. Then, a similarity function maps
these two feature vectors to a similarity score, which is then
compared to a threshold. A similarity score above the threshold
indicates that X1 and X2 have the same forensic trace (e.g.
processing history or source camera model), and a similarity
score below the threshold indicates that they have different
forensic traces.
Examples of forensic similarity scores are shown in Fig. 2.
In this example, we calculated forensic similarity scores be-
tween small patches randomly chosen from three different
images: two captured by a Google Pixel 1, and one captured
by an Asus Zenfone 3. Neither of these camera models were
used to train the system. When both patches were captured
by the same camera model, forensic similarity scores are high
and near one, as shown in by the blue distribution in Fig. 2(d).
When both patches were captured by different camera models,
the forensic similarity scores are low and near zero, as shown
by the orange curve. An important quality to note is that foren-
sic similarity is invariant to the semantic content depicted in
the image. For example, even though image (a) and image (c)
depict very similar scenes their forensic similarity is low since
they were captured by different camera models. This is an
important distinction from computer vision approaches such as
object detection and scene recognition, which are invariant to
any non-content related qualities such as source camera model.
III. PROPOSED APPROACH
In this section, we describe our proposed deep learning sys-
tem architecture and associated training procedure for forensic
similarity. In our proposed forensic similarity architecture and
training procedure, we build upon prior CNN-based techniques
used in multimedia forensics literature, as well as propose
a number of innovations that are aimed at extracting robust
forensic features from images and accurately determining
forensic similarity between two image patches.
Our proposed forensic similarity system consists of two
conceptual elements: 1) a CNN-based feature extractor that
maps an input image onto a low-dimensional feature space
that encodes high level forensic information, and 2) a three-
layer neural network, which we call the similarity network,
that maps pairs of these features to a score indicating whether
two image patches contain the same forensic trace. This system
is trained in two successive phases. In the first phase, called
Learning Phase A, we train the feature extractor. In the
second phase, called Learning Phase B we train the similarity
network. Finally, in this section we describe an entropy-based
method of patch selection, which we use to filter out patches
that are not suitable for forensic analysis.
A. Learning Phase A - Feature Extractor
Here we describe the deep-learning architecture and training
procedure of the feature extractor that maps an input image
patch onto a low dimensional feature space, which encodes
forensic information about the patch. This is the mapping
described by (3). Later, pairs these feature vectors are used as
input to the similarity network described below in Sec. III-B.
Developments in machine learning research have shown
that CNNs are powerful tools when used as generic feature
extractors. This is done by robustly training a deep convolu-
tional neural network for a particular task, and then using the
neuron activations, at a deep layer in the network, as a feature
representation of an image [27]. These neuron activations
are called “deep features,” and are often extracted from the
last fully connected layer of a network. Research has shown
that deep features extracted from a CNN trained for object
recognition tasks can be used to perform scene recognition
tasks [28] and remote sensing tasks [29].
In multimedia forensics research, it has been shown that
deep features based approaches also very powerful for digital
image forensics tasks. For example, work in [14] showed that
deep features from a network trained on one set of camera
models can be used to train an support vector machine to
identify a different set of camera models. Work in [17] showed
that deep features from a CNN can be used to determine
whether an image was captured by a camera model used
during training. Furthermore, it has been shown that deep
features from a CNN trained for camera model identification
transfer very well to other forensic tasks such manipulation
detection [23], suggesting that deep features related to digital
forensics are general to a variety of forensics tasks.
1) Architecture: To build a forensic feature extractor, we
adapt the MISLnet CNN architecture developed in [7], which
has been utilized in a number of works that target different
digital image forensics tasks including manipulation detec-
tion [6], [7], [30] and camera model identification [23], [30].
Briefly, this CNN consists of 5 convolutional blocks, labeled
‘conv1’ through ‘conv5’ in Fig. 3 and two fully connected
layers labeled ‘fc1’ and ‘fc2’. Each convolutional block, with
the exception of the first, contains a convolutional layer fol-
lowed by batch normalization, activation, and finally a pooling
operation. The two fully connected layers, labeled ‘fc1’ and
‘fc2,’ each consist of 200 neurons with hyperbolic tangent
activation. Further details of this CNN are found in [7].
To use this CNN as a deep feature extractor, an image patch
is fed forward through the (trained) CNN. Then, the activated
neuron values in the last fully connected layer, ‘fc2’ in Fig. 3,
are recorded. These recorded neuron values are then used as a
feature vector that represents high-level forensic information
about the image. The extraction of deep-features from an
image patch is the mapping in (3), where the feature dimension
N = 200 corresponding to the number of neurons in ‘fc2.’
The architecture of this CNN-based feature extractor is
similar to the architecture we used in our prior work in [22].
However, in this work we alter the CNN architecture in two
ways to improve the robustness of the feature extractor. First,
we use full color image patches in RGB as input to the net-
work, instead of just the green color channel used previously.
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Fig. 3. The neural network architecture of the proposed forensic similarity system. The system is composed of a pair of CNN-based feature extractors, in a
hard sharing (Siamese) configuration, which feed low-dimensional, high-level forensic feature vectors to the similarity network. The similarity network is a
neural network that maps feature vectors from two image patches to a similarity score indicating whether they contain the same or different forensic traces.
Since many important forensic features are expressed across
different color channels, it is important for the network to learn
these feature representations. This is done by modifying each
5×5 convolutional kernel to be of dimension 5×5×3, where
the last dimension corresponds to image’s the color channel.
We relax the constraint imposed on the first convolutional
layer in [7] which is used to encourage the network to learn
prediction error residuals. This constraint is defined in [7] for
single channel image patches, but not color images. Second,
we double the number of kernels in the first convolutional layer
from 3 to 6, to increase the expressive power of the network.
The feature extractor architecture is depicted by each of
the two identical ‘Feature Extractor’ blocks in Fig. 3. In our
proposed system, we use two identical feature extractors, in
‘Siamese’ configuration [31], to map two input image patches
X1 and X2 to features f(X1) and f(X2). This configuration
ensures that the feature extraction step is symmetric, i.e. the
ordering of X1 and X2 does not impact the extracted feature
values. We refer to the Siamese feature extractor blocks as
using hard sharing, meaning that the exact same weights and
biases are shared between the two blocks.
2) Training Methodology: In our proposed approach we
first train the feature extractor during Learning Phase A. To do
this, we add an additional fully-connected layer with softmax
activation to the feature extractor architecture. We provide the
feature extractor with image patches and labels associated with
the forensic trace of each image patch. Then, the we iteratively
train the network using stochastic gradient descent with a
cross-entropy loss function. Training is performed for 30
epochs with an initial learning rate of 0.001, which is halved
every three epochs, and a batch size of 50 image patches.
During Learning Phase A we train the feature extractor
network on a closed set of forensic traces referred to as
“known forensic traces.” Research in [23] found that training
a CNN in this way yields deep-feature representations that
are general to other forensic tasks. In particular, it was shown
that when a feature extractor was trained for camera model
identification, it was very transferable to other forensic tasks.
Because of this, during Learning Phase A we train the feature
extractor on a large set of image patches with labels associated
with their source camera model.
In this work, we train two versions of the feature extractor
network: one feature extractor that uses 256×256 image
patches as input and another that uses 128×128 image patches
as input. We note that to decrease the patch size further would
require substantial architecture changes due to the pooling
layers. In each case, we train the network using 2,000,000
image patches from the 50 camera models in the “Camera
model set A” found in Table I.
The feature extractor is then updated again in Learning
Phase B, as described below in Sec. III-B. This is signif-
icantly different than in our previous work in [22], where
the feature extractor remains frozen after Learning Phase A.
In our experimental evaluation in Sec. IV-A, we show that
allowing the feature extractor to update during Learning Phase
B significantly improves system performance.
B. Learning Phase B - Similarity Network
Here, we describe our proposed neural network architecture
that maps a pair of forensic feature vectors f(X1) and f(X2)
to a similarity score ∈ [0, 1] as described in (4). The similarity
score, when compared to a threshold, indicates whether the
pair of image patches X1 and X2 have the same or different
forensic traces. We call this proposed neural network the
similarity network, and is depicted in the right-hand side of
Fig. 3. Briefly, the network consists of 3 layers of neurons,
which we view as a hierarchical mapping of two input features
vectors to successive feature spaces and ultimately an output
score indicating forensic similarity.
1) Architecture: The first layer of neurons, labeled by ‘fcA’
in Fig. 3, contains 2048 neurons with ReLU activation. This
layer maps an input feature vector f(X) to a new, intermediate
feature space finter(X). We use two identical ‘fcA’ layers, in
Siamese (hard sharing) configuration, to map each of the input
vectors f(X1) and f(X2) into finter(X1) and finter(X2).
This mapping for the kth value of the intermediate feature
vector is calculated by an artificial neuron function:
fk,inter (X) = φ
(
N∑
i=1
wk,i fi (X) + bk
)
, (6)
which is the weighted summation, with weights wk,1 through
wk,N , of the N = 200 elements in the deep-feature vector
6f(X), bias term bk and subsequent activation by ReLU func-
tion φ(·). The weights and bias for each element of finter(X)
are arrived at through stochastic gradient descent optimization
as described below.
Next the second layer of neurons, labeled by ‘fcB’ in Fig. 3,
contains 64 neurons with ReLU activation. As input to this
layer, we create a vector
fconcat(X1, X2) =
 finter(X1)finter(X2)
finter(X1) finter(X2)
 , (7)
that is the concatenation of finter(X1), finter(X2) and
finter(X1)finter(X2), where  is the element-wise product
operation. This layer maps the input vector fconcat(X1, X2)
to a new ‘similarity’ feature space fsim(X1, X2) ∈ R64 using
the artificial neuron mapping described in (6). This similarity
feature space encodes information about the relative forensic
information between patches X1 and X2.
Finally, a single neuron with sigmoid activation maps the
similarity vector fsim(X1, X2) to a single score. We call
this neuron the ‘similarity neuron,’ since it outputs a single
score ∈ [0, 1], where a small value indicates X1 and X2
contain different forensic traces, and larger values indicate
they contain the same forensic trace. In practice, to facilitate
training, we use two neurons with softmax and cross-entropy
loss, with one neuron indicating “similar” and the other
indicating “different.” During evaluation, we only observe the
softmax value of the “similar” neuron which behaves like a
sigmoid. To make a decision, we compare the similarity score
to a threshold η typically set to 0.5.
The proposed similarity network architecture differs from
our prior work in [22] in that we increase the number
of neurons in ‘fcA’ from 1024 to 2048, and we add to
the concatenation vector the elementwise multiplication of
finter(X1) and finter(X2). Research in [32] showed that
the elementwise product of feature vectors were powerful
for speaker verification tasks in machine learning systems.
These additions increase the expressive power of the similarity
network, and as a result improve system performance.
2) Training Methodology: Here, we describe the second
step of the forensic similarity system training procedure,
called Learning Phase B. In this learning phase, we train the
similarity network to learn a forensic similarity mapping for
any type of measurable forensic trace, such as whether two
image patches were captured by the same or different camera
model, or manipulated by the same or different editing
operation. We control which forensic traces are targeted by
the system with the choice of training sample and labels
provided during training.
Notably, during Learning Phase B, we allow the error to
back propagate through the feature extractor and update the
feature extractor weights. This allows the feature extractor to
learn better feature representations associated with the type
of forensic trace targeted in this learning phase. Allowing
the feature extractor to update during Learning Phase B
significantly differs from the implementation in [22], which
used a frozen feature extractor.
We train the similarity network (and update the feature
extractor simultaneously) using stochastic gradient descent
for 30 epochs, with an initial learning rate of 0.005 which
is halved every three epochs. The descriptions of training
samples and associated labels used in Learning Phase B are
described in Sec. IV, where we investigate efficacy on different
types of forensic traces.
C. Patch Selection
Some image patches may not contain sufficient information
to be reliably analyzed for forensics purposes [34]. Here,
we describe a method for selecting image patches that are
appropriate for forensic analysis. In this paper we use an en-
tropy based selection method to filter out image patches prior
to analyzing their forensic similarity. This filter is employed
during evaluation only and not while training.
To do this, we view a forensic trace as an amount of
information encoded in an image that has been induced by
some processing operation. An image patch is a channel
that communicates this information. From this channel, we
extract forensic information, via the feature extractor, and then
compare pairs of these features using the similarity network.
Consequently, an image patch must have sufficient capacity in
order to encode meaningful forensic information.
When evaluating pairs of image patches, we ensure that both
patches have sufficient capacity to encode a forensic trace by
measuring their entropy. Here, entropy h is defined as
h = −
255∑
k=0
pk ln (pk) , (8)
where pk is the probability that a pixel has luminance value k
in the image patch. Entropy h is measured in nats. We estimate
pk by measuring the proportion of pixels in an image patch
that have luminance value k.
When evaluating image patches, we ensure that both image
patches have entropy between 1.8 and 5.2 nats. We chose these
values since 95% of image patches in our database fall within
this range. Intuitively, the minimum threshold for our patch
selection method eliminates flat (e.g. saturated) image patches.
Saturated patches have similar appearance regardless of differ-
ences in the source camera model or processing history. This
method also removes patches with very high entropy. In this
case, there is high pixel value variation in the image that may
obfuscate the forensic trace. We experimentally validate these
threshold choices in Sec. IV-A.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We conducted a series of experiments to test the efficacy of
our proposed forensic similarity system in different scenarios.
In these experiments, we tested our system accuracy in deter-
mining whether two image patches were 1) captured by the
same or different camera model, 2) manipulated by the same
or different editing operation, and 3) manipulated by the same
or different manipulation parameter, given a particular editing
operation. These scenarios were chosen for their variety in
types of forensic traces and because those traces are targeted
in forensic investigations [7], [14], [15]. Additionally, we con-
ducted experiments that examined properties of the forensic
similarity system, including: the effects of patch size and post-
compression, comparison to other similarity measures, and the
impact of network design and training procedure choices.
7TABLE I
CAMERA MODELS USED IN TRAINING (SETS A AND B) AND TESTING (SET C). NOTE THAT A ∩B = A ∩ C = B ∩ C = ∅.∗DENOTES FROM THE DRESDEN IMAGE DATABASE [33]
Camera model set A
Apple iPhone 4 Agfa Sensor530s∗ Canon SX420 IS LG Nexus 5x Nikon S710∗ Pentax OptioA40∗ Samsung L74wide∗ Sony NEX-5TL
Apple iPhone 4s Canon EOS SL1 Canon SX610 HS Motorola Maxx Nikon D200∗ Praktica DCZ5.9∗ Samsung NV15∗
Apple iPhone 5 Canon PC1730 Casio EX-Z150∗ Motorola Turbo Nikon D3200 Ricoh GX100∗ Sony DSC-H300
Apple iPhone 5s Canon A580 Fujifilm S8600 Motorola X Nikon D7100 Rollei RCP-7325XS∗ Sony DSC-W800
Apple iPhone 6 Canon ELPH 160 Huawei Honor 5x Motorola XT1060 Panasonic DMC-FZ50∗ Samsung Note4 Sony DSC-WX350
Apple iPhone 6+ Canon S100 LG G2 Nikon S33 Panasonic FZ200 Samsung S2 Sony DSC-H50∗
Apple iPhone 6s Canon SX530 HS LG G3 Nikon S7000 Pentax K-7 Samsung S4 Sony DSC-T77∗
Camera model set B
Apple iPad Air 2 Blackberry Leap Canon SX400 IS HTC One M7 Motorola Nexus 6 Olympus TG-860 Samsung Note5 Sony A6000
Apple iPhone 5c Canon Ixus70∗ Canon T4i Kodak C813∗ Nikon D70∗ Panasonic TS30 Samsung S3 Sony DSC-W170∗
Agfa DC-733s∗ Canon PC1234 Fujifilm XP80 Kodak M1063 Nikon D7000 Pentax OptioW60∗ Samsung S5
Agfa DC-830i∗ Canon G10 Fujifilm J50∗ LG Nexus 5 Nokia Lumia 920 Samsung Note3 Samsung S7
Camera model set C
Agfa DC-504∗ Canon Ixus55∗ Canon Rebel T3i LG Realm Nikon D3000 Samsung Lite Samsung Note2 Sony DSC-T70
Agfa Sensor505x∗ Canon A640∗ LG Optimus L90 Nikon S3700 Olympus 1050SW∗ Samsung Nexus Samsung S6 Edge
The results of these experiments show that our proposed
forensic similarity system is highly accurate for comparing a
variety of types of forensic traces across two image patches.
Importantly, these experiments show this system is accurate
even on “unknown” forensic traces that were not used to
train the system. Furthermore, the experiments show that our
proposed system significantly improves upon prior art in [22],
reducing error rates by over 50%.
To do this, we started with a database of 47,785 images
collected from 95 different camera models, which are listed in
Table I. Images from 26 camera models were collected as part
of the Dresden Image Database “Natural images” dataset [33].
The remaining 69 camera models were from our own database
comprised of point-and-shoot, cellphone, and DSLR cameras
from which we collected at minimum 300 images with diverse
and varied scene content. The camera models were split into
three disjoint sets, A, B, and C. Images from A were used
to train the feature extractor in Learning Phase A, images
from A and B were used to train the similarity network in
Learning Phase B, and images from C were used for evaluation
only. First, set A was determined by randomly selecting 50
camera models from among those that had at least 40,000 non-
overlapping 256×256 patches. Next, camera model set B was
selected by randomly choosing 30 camera models, from among
the remaining, which had at least 25,000 non-overlapping
256×256 patches. Finally, the remaining 15 camera models
were assigned to C.
In all experiments, we started with a pre-trained feature
extractor that was trained from 2,000,000 randomly chosen
image patches from camera models in A (40,000 patches per
model) with labels corresponding to their camera model, as
described in Sec. III. For all experiments, we started with this
feature extractor. Research in [23] showed that deep features
related to camera model identification are a good starting point
for extracting other types of forensic information, including
identification of manipulation operations.
Next, in each experiment we conducted Learning Phase B
to target a specific type of forensic trace. To do this, we
created a training dataset of pairs of image patches. These
pairs were selected by randomly choosing 400,000 image
patches of size 256×256 from images in camera model sets
A and B, with 50% of patch pairs chosen from the same
camera model, and 50% from different camera models. For
experiments where the source camera model was compared,
a label of 0 or 1 was assigned to each pair corresponding to
whether they were captured by different or the same camera
model. For experiments where we compared the manipulation
type or manipulation parameter, these image patches were
then further manipulated (as described in each experiment
below) and a label assigned indicating the same or different
manipulation type/parameter. Training was performed using
Tensorflow v1.10.0 on a Nvidia GTX 1080 Ti.
To evaluate system performance, we created an evaluation
dataset of 1,200,000 pairs of image patches, which were
selected by randomly choosing 256×256 image patches from
the 15 camera models in set C (“unknown” camera models
not used in training). We also included image patches from
10 camera models randomly chosen from set A. One device
from each of these 10 “known” camera models was withheld
from training, and only images from these devices were
used in this evaluation dataset. For experiments where we
compared the manipulation type or manipulation parameter,
the pairs of image patches in the evaluation dataset were
then further manipulated (as described in each experiment
below) and assigned a label indicating the same or different
manipulation type/parameter.
A. Source Camera Model Comparison
In this experiment, we tested the efficacy of our proposed
forensic similarity approach for determining whether two
image patches were captured by the same or different camera
model. To do this, during Learning Phase B we trained the
similarity network using the an expanded training dataset
of 1,000,000 pairs of 256×256 image patches selected from
camera models in A and B, with labels indicating whether the
source camera model was the same or different. Evaluation
was then performed on the evaluation dataset of 1,200,000
pairs from camera models in A (known) and C (unknown).
Fig. 4 shows the accuracy of our proposed forensic sim-
ilarity system, broken down by camera model pairing. The
diagonal entries of the matrix show the correct classification
rates of when two image patches were captured by the same
camera model. The non-diagonal entries of the matrix show
the correct classification rates of when two image patches
were captured by different camera models. For example, when
both image patches were captured by a Canon Rebel T3i
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Fig. 4. Camera model correct comparison rates for 25 different camera models. Same camera model correct classification rates are on the diagonal, and
different camera model correct classification rates are in the non-diagonal entries. Ten camera models were used in training, i.e. “Known” camera models,
and 15 were not used in training, i.e. are “Unknown” with respect to the classifier. The background color scales with classification rate.
our system correctly identified their source camera model as
“the same” 98% of the time. When one image patch was
captured by a Canon PowerShot A640 and the other image
patch was captured by a Nikon CoolPix S710, our system
correctly identified that they were captured by different camera
models 100% of the time.
The overall classification accuracy for all cases was 94.00%.
The upper-left region shows classification accuracy for when
two image patches were captured by known camera models,
Casio EX-Z150 through iPhone 6s. The total accuracy for
the known versus known cases was 95.93%. The upper-right
region shows classification accuracy for when one patch was
captured by an unknown camera model, Agfa DC-504 through
Sony Cybershot DSC-T70, and the other patch was captured
by a known camera model. The total accuracy for the known
versus unknown cases was 93.72%. The lower-right region
shows classification accuracy for when both image patches
were captured by unknown camera models. For the unknown
versus unknown cases, the total accuracy was 92.41%. This
result shows that while the proposed forensic similarity system
performs better on known camera models, the system is accu-
rate on image patches captured by unknown camera models.
In the majority of camera model pairs, our proposed forensic
similarity system is highly accurate, and achieved >95% ac-
curacy in 257 of the 325 unique pairings of all camera models,
and 95 of the 120 possible pairs of unknown camera models.
There are also certain pairs where the system does not achieve
high comparison accuracy. Many of these cases occurred when
two image patches were captured by similar camera models
of the same manufacturer. As an example, when one camera
model was an iPhone 6 and the other an iPhone 6s, the
system only achieved a 26% correct classification rate. This
was likely due to the similarity in hardware and processing
pipeline of both of these cellphones, leading to very similar
forensic traces. This phenomenon was also observed in the
cases of Canon Powershot A640 versus Canon Ixus 55, any
combination of LG phones, Samsung Galaxy S6 Edge versus
Samsung Galaxy Lite, and Nikon Coolpix S3700 versus Nikon
D3000. In only a few cases, low comparison rates were found
across camera brands, such as with the Samsung Galaxy Nexus
and Motorola X. There are many potential sources of this
confusion, such as the licensing of similar technologies, which
are the subject of further research. Still, high similarity perfor-
mance was achieved in the majority of camera model pairings.
The results of this experiment show that our proposed
forensic similarity system is effective at determining whether
two image patches were captured by the same or different
camera model, even when the camera models were unknown,
i.e. not used to train the system. This experiment also shows
that, while the system achieves high accuracy in most cases,
there are certain pairs of camera models where the system does
not achieve high accuracy and this often due to the underlying
similarity of the camera model systems themselves.
1) Patch Size and Re-Compression Effects: A forensic
investigator may encounter smaller image patches and/or
images that have undergone additional compression. In
this experiment, we examined the performance of our
proposed system when presented with input images that have
undergone a second JPEG compression and when the patch
size is reduced to a of size 128×128.
To do this, we repeated the above source camera model
comparison experiment in several scenarios: input patches
with size 256×256, input patches of size 128×128, JPEG re-
compressed patches of size 256×256, and finally JPEG re-
compressed patches of size 128×128. We first created copies
of the training dataset and evaluation dataset. In these copies,
each image in the database was JPEG re-compressed prior to
extracting patches. Six such copies were made using JPEG
quality factors of 70, 75, 80, 85, 90, and 95. We then trained
one similarity network (Learning Phase B) per each pairing
970 75 80 85 90 95 None
JPEG Re-Compression Quality Factor
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 A
cc
ur
ac
y 
(T
ot
al
) Patch Size = 256x256
Patch Size = 128x128
Fig. 5. Camera model comparison accuracy with different patch sizes and
JPEG re-compression quality factors.
of patch size and JPEG quality factor. For experiments using
128×128 patches, we used the same 256×256 patches but
cropped so only the top-left corner remained.
Fig. 5 shows comparison accuracy at different re-
compression quality factors for the two patch sizes. This
accuracy includes the “known versus known”, “known ver-
sus unknown”, and “unknown versus unknown” cases. At
each quality factor, the network trained with a patch size of
256×256 patch size outperformed the 128×128 patch size.
This effect was more pronounced at lower quality factors.
For example, at a quality factor of 95, the 256×256 sys-
tem achieved 91.83% accuracy whereas the 128×128 sys-
tem achieved 88.63% accuracy. At a quality factor of 75,
the 256×256 system achieved 74.04% accuracy whereas the
128×128 system achieved 68.83% accuracy. The result of
this experiment shows that both patch size and JPEG re-
compression impact overall system performance. Still, even
under moderate re-compression conditions, our system is able
to accurately compare forensic traces.
2) Other Approaches: In this experiment, we compared
the accuracy of our proposed approach to other approaches
including standard distance metrics, support vector machines
(SVM), extremely randomized trees (ER Trees), contrastive
loss optimization [35], and prior art in [22].
For the SVM and ER Trees machine learning approaches,
we trained each method on deep features of the training
dataset extracted by the feature extractor after Learning
Phase A. We did this to emulate Learning Phase B where
the machine learning approach is used in place of our
proposed similarity network. We compared a support vector
machine (SVM) with RBF kernel γ = 0.01, C = 1.0, and an
Extremely Randomized Trees (ER Trees) classifier with 800
estimators and minimum split depth of 3. We also compared
to the method proposed in [22], and used the same training
and evaluation data as with our proposed method.
To compare against a popular technique that utilizes a
Siamese-based architecture, we compared to the contrastive
method proposed in [35]. During Learning Phase B, instead
of a similarity network, we used the contrastive loss function
to further update the feature extractor. This loss function
encourages pairs of forensic feature vectors to have large
Euclidean distances for different classes, and small Euclidean
distances for similar classes.
TABLE II
CAMERA MODEL COMPARISON ACCURACY USING STANDARD DISTANCES
AND LEARNED SIMILARITY MEASURES
Learning Phase
Distance A B Learned Measure
1 Norm 92.37% 93.06% MS‘18 [22] 85.70%
2 Norm 92.68% 93.28% ER Trees 92.44%
Inf. Norm 90.98% 91.73% SVM 92.84%
Bray-Curtis 91.98% 92.57% Contrastive Loss [35] 92.99%
Cosine 92.22% 92.87% Proposed 93.61%
For the distance measures, we extracted deep features from
the evaluation set after Learning Phase A and after Learning
Phase B. We measured the distance between each pair of deep
features and compared to a threshold. The threshold for each
approach was chosen to be the one that maximized total accu-
racy. For features extracted after Learning Phase A, we used
a version of the network which was trained on the 80 camera
models in A and B. This was done to normalize data diversity
effects since features extracted after Learning Phase B and
learned measures have the benefit of additional training data.
The total classification accuracy achieved on the evaluation
set is shown in Table II, with the proposed system accuracy of
93.61% shown for reference. For the fixed distance measures,
the 2-Norm distance achieved the highest accuracy of 93.28%
using features extracted after Learning Phase B, and 92.68%
using features extracted after Learning Phase A. This result
shows that the similarity network improves upon similarity
performance over standard distances. The result also shows
that Learning Phase B improves the accuracy of standard
distances on extracted features.
For the learned measures, the ER Trees classifier achieved
an accuracy of 92.44%, the SVM achieved an accuracy
of 92.84%, and the contrastive loss function achieved an
accuracy of 92.99%, all lower than the proposed similarity
network. We also compared against the architecture and
training procedure proposed in our previous work [22],
which achieved a total accuracy of 85.70%. The results of
this experiment show that our proposed system outperforms
other distance measures and learned similarity measures, and
significantly improves upon prior work in [22] decreasing the
comparison error rate by over 50%.
3) Impact of Training Procedure: In this experiment, we
examined the effects of two design aspects in the Learning
Phase B training procedure. In particular, these aspects are
1) allowing the feature extractor to update, i.e. unfrozen
during training, and 2) using a diverse training dataset. This
experiment was conducted to explicitly compare to the training
procedure in [22], where the feature extractor was not updated
(frozen) in Learning Phase B and only a subset of available
training camera models were used.
To do this, we created an additional training database of
400,000 image patch pairs of size 256×256, mimicking the
original training dataset, but containing only image patches
captured by camera models in set B. This was done since the
procedure in [22] specified to conduct Learning Phase B on
camera models that were not used in Learning Phase A. We
refer to this as training set B, and the original training set
as AB. We then performed Learning Phase B using each of
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TABLE III
PERFORMANCE OF DIFFERENT TRAINING METHODS
Training Data Feature Extractor Accuracy
B Frozen 90.24%
B Unfrozen 90.96%
AB Frozen 92.56%
AB Unfrozen 93.61%
these datasets. Furthermore, we repeated each training scenario
where the learning rate multiplier in each layer in the feature
extractor layer was set to 0, i.e. the feature extractor was
frozen. This was done to compare to the procedure in [22]
which used a frozen feature extractor.
The overall accuracy achieved by each of the four scenarios
is shown in Table III. When using training on set B with a
frozen feature extractor, which is the same procedure used
in [22], the total accuracy on the evaluation image patches
was 90.24%. When allowing the feature extractor to update,
accuracy increased by 0.72 percentage points to 90.96%. When
increasing training data diversity to camera model set AB, but
using a frozen feature extractor the accuracy achieved was
92.56%. Finally, when using a diverse dataset and an unfrozen
feature extractor, total accuracy achieved was 93.61%.
The results of this experiment show that our proposed train-
ing procedure is a significant improvement over the procedure
using in [22], improving accuracy 3.37 percentage points.
Furthermore, we can see the added benefit of our proposed
architecture enhancements when comparing the result MS‘18
in Table II, which uses both the training procedure and system
architecture of [22]. Improving the system architecture alone
raised classification rates from 85.70% to 90.24%. Improving
the training procedure further raised classification rates to
93.61%, together reducing the error rate by more than half.
4) Architecture Variants: In this experiment, we examined
the impact of design choices related to the proposed feature ex-
tractor and similarity network. To do this, we repeated the ini-
tial experiment with several variations on system architecture.
Table IV shows the overall camera model comparison
accuracy using different architecture variants. In the first case,
we used only the green channel as input. In this case, 91.13%
accuracy was achieved, increasing the error rate by 2.48
percentage points. This equates to a 39% relative increase
in error from the 93.61% accuracy achieved by the proposed
system. The relative error increase (REI) is calculated by the
formula REI = (Acc1−Acc2)(100−Acc1) , where Acc1 is the accuracy
achieved the proposed system, and Acc2 is the accuracy
achieved by the variations of the proposed architecture. The
REI captures the percent change in error rate by using a variant
of the proposed architecture.
In the second case, we also used the green channel as input
and a convolutional constraint on the first layer according to
[7]. This was the configuration used in our previous work
in [22]. In this case, 91.45% accuracy was achieved. This result
shows that the proposed full color information is important for
camera model comparisons.
In a third case, we removed the elementwise-multiplication
structure in the similarity network. In this case, the error rate
increased by 0.51 percentage points, or an 8% relative error
increase. In the final case, we removed the entropy-based patch
TABLE IV
CAMERA MODEL COMPARISON PERFORMANCE BY ARCHITECTURE
VARIANT, AND ASSOCIATED RELATIVE ERROR INCREASE (REI)
System Attribute Accuracy Difference REI
Proposed 93.61%
Green channel only 91.13% -2.48 39%
Green channel only, with constraint 91.45% -2.16 34%
Without elementwise multiplication 93.10% -0.51 8%
Without entropy filtering 93.02% -0.59 9%
filter, which increased the error rate by 0.59 percentage points,
or a 9% relative error increase.
The results of this experiment show that architecture im-
provements over prior work [22] led to improved forensic
similarity performance. Notably, moving to full color input
from green-channel-only led to most significant improvement.
5) Impact of Entropy Threshold: In this experiment, we
investigated the impact of patch filtering using entropy thresh-
olds on performance of forensic similarity. To do this, we
repeated the initial camera model comparison experiment
and varied the minimum and maximum entropy thresholds
described in Sec. III-C.
Fig. 6(a) shows the overall correct comparison rate at differ-
ent entropy thresholds. When both patches have low entropy
between 0 and 1.75, the comparison accuracy is 78.71%. These
patches are typically saturated, where it is difficult to extract
meaningful forensic information. When patches have entropy
between 2 and 2.75, the overall comparison accuracy is sig-
nificantly higher at 95.73%. These patches are typically “flat”
in appearance, but not saturated. Our intuition for why these
patches work well is that the system is able to more effectively
separate forensic traces from relatively uniform scene content.
When patches have high entropy between 5 and 5.4, the overall
comparison accuracy is lower at 93.45%. Our intuition for
why these patches are slightly harder to compare is that they
contain highly varying scene content, which obfuscates the
forensic traces. These intuitions are corroborated by findings
in [34], which found that patches with high semantic content
were often less reliable for forensics purposes.
Different applications have different tolerances for the
amount of patches needed for analysis. Fig. 6(b) shows the
distribution of entropy calculated from patches in our testing
dataset. We chose a minimum entropy of 1.8 and maximum of
5.2 since they are relatively permissive, allowing for 95% of
patches to be analyzed while maximizing performance. In ap-
plications that can be more selective with patches, higher per-
formance can be achieved with greater selectivity of patches.
6) Unknown Brands: In the above experiments, we tested
forensic similarity performance on unknown camera models.
The unknown camera models in Camera Model Set C were
captured by brands, such as Apple or Canon, that were also
within the training sets. In this experiment, we test perfor-
mance on brands that do not exist within the training set. To do
this, we used the VISION database [36] and selected 6 camera
models with brands not in Camera Model Sets A or B. These
camera models are: Asus ZenFone 2 Laser, Lenovo P70A,
Microsoft Lumia640LTE, OnePlus A3000, Wiko Ridge4G,
and Xiaomi RedmiNote3. Then, we randomly selected 1000
pairs of patches from each pairing of camera models from the
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Fig. 6. (a) Camera model comparison accuracy at different entropy thresholds,
and (b) the distribution of patches by entropy in our testing dataset. The patch
entropy has significant impact on forensic similarity performance.
“natural scene” images within this database, and calculated the
forensic similarity between these pairs of patches.
Correct comparison rates for these unknown brands are
shown in Fig. 7. When both patches were captured by the same
camera model, four out of the six camera models achieved
95% or greater correct comparison accuracy. When patches
were captured by different camera models, ten out of the
fifteen pairings achieved 95% or greater correct comparison
accuracy. The overall comparison accuracy achieved was
89.77%, which is slightly less than the 92.41% accuracy
achieved for the original experiment with unknown camera
models but with known brands. Forensic similarity perfor-
mance was high for some camera models in this experiment,
such as with the Lenovo P70A which achieved 98% or greater
correct comparison rates in all cases. The approach did not per-
form as well in other cases, such as when comparing patches
from a OnePlus A3000 camera model and WikoRidge 4G
camera model, which was only able to correctly differentiate
between 5% of patch pairs. The exact mechanisms or features
that were confused between these camera models is not known,
and is a topic for further investigation.
The result of this experiment shows that forensic similarity
comparisons are effective even on brands of camera models
that were not used to train the system. High comparison accu-
racy was achieved in the majority of camera model pairings.
B. Editing Operation Comparison
A forensic investigator is often interested in determining
whether two image patches have the same processing history.
In this experiment, we investigated the efficacy of our proposed
approach for determining whether two image patches were ma-
nipulated by the same or different editing operation, including
“unknown” editing operations not used to train the system.
To do this, we started with the training database of image
patch pairs. We then modified each patch with one of the
eight “known” manipulations in Table V, with a randomly
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Fig. 7. Camera model comparison rates for camera brands not used in training.
chosen editing parameter. We manipulated 50% of the image
patch pairs with the same editing operation, but with different
parameter, and manipulated 50% of the pairs with different
editing operations. The known manipulations were the same
manipulations used in [6] and [8]. We repeated this for the
evaluation database, using both the “known” and “unknown”
manipulations. Wiener filtering was performed using the SciPy
python library, web dithering was performed using the Python
Image Library, and salt and pepper noise was performed using
the SciPy image processing toolbox (skimage). We note that
the histogram equalization and JPEG compression manipula-
tions were performed on the whole image. We then performed
Learning Phase B using the manipulated training database,
with labels associated with each pair corresponding to whether
they have been manipulated by the same or different editing
operation. Finally, we evaluated accuracy on the evaluation
dataset, with patches processed in a similar manner.
Fig. 8 shows the correct classification rates of our proposed
forensic similarity system, broken down by manipulation
pairing, with the first eight columns and rows corresponding
to known manipulations, and the final three corresponding to
the unknown manipulations. For example, when one image
patch was manipulated with salt and pepper noise and the
other patch was manipulated with histogram equalization,
our proposed system correctly identified that the two patches
were edited by different manipulations at a rate of 95%.
When both image patches were edited with Wiener filtering,
the system correctly identified that they were edited by the
same manipulation at a rate of 96%.
The system achieved high comparison accuracy in the
vast majority of cases. However, there were certain pairs of
manipulations which proved difficult to correctly compare.
One critical case occurred when one patch was unaltered and
one patch was JPEG recompressed. This scenario had a 76%
correct comparison rate. This result is not unexpected, as all
unaltered patches are from images naturally in JPEG format.
Research in [10] showed that there are many cases in which
double JPEG compression cannot be differentiated from single
JPEG compression, including when the original JPEG quality
factor is similar to or greater than the second JPEG quality
factor. Such cases are often encountered in the evaluation set.
Other difficult cases occurred when one patch was unaltered
and the other was sharpened or histogram equalized. A poten-
tial explanation for this is that sharpening and histogram equal-
ization induce only slight forensic traces in patches where no
edge content exists or when the histogram is already equalized.
The majority of scenarios involving unknown manipulations
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TABLE V
KNOWN MANIPULATIONS USED IN TRAINING AND UNKNOWN
MANIPULATIONS USED IN EVALUATION, WITH ASSOCIATED PARAMETERS
Manipulation Parameter Value Range
Known Manipulations
Unaltered − −
Resizing (bilinear) Scaling factor [0.6, 0.9] ∪ [1.1, 1.9]
Gaussian blur (5×5) σ [1.0, 2.0]
Median blur Kernel size {3, 5, 7}
AWG Noise σ [1.5, 2.5]
JPEG Compression Quality factor {50, 51, 52, . . . , 95}
Unsharp mask (r = 2, t = 3) Percent [50, 200]
Adaptive Hist. Eq. − −
Unknown Manipulations
Weiner filter Kernel size {3, 5, 7}
Web dithering − −
Salt + pepper noise Percent {5, 6, 7, . . . , 20}
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Fig. 8. Correct comparison rates when comparing manipulation type of two
image patches, with known and unknown manipulations.
similarly achieved high comparison accuracy. Correct compar-
ison accuracy of 90% or greater was achieved in 19 of 24
unknown versus known cases, and in 5 of 6 unknown versus
unknown cases. However, some unknown manipulations were
difficult to correctly compare. The scenario of Wiener filtering
versus Gaussian blurring incorrect comparisons were likely
due to the smoothing similarities between Wiener filtering and
Gaussian blurring. Web dithering versus sharpening, salt and
pepper versus sharpening, and web dithering versus salt and
pepper noise also were challenging. The cases are likely due
to the addition of similar high frequency artifacts introduced
by these operations. When including these unknown manipu-
lations in training, correct comparison accuracy over 98% is
achieved in these cases. This highlights the need for a breadth
of training manipulations for a well generalized system.
The results of this experiment demonstrate that our proposed
forensic similarity is system is effective at comparing the
processing history of image patches, even when image patches
have undergone an editing operation that was unknown, i.e. not
used during training.
C. Editing Parameter Comparison
In this experiment, we investigated the efficacy of our
proposed approach for determining whether two image patches
have been manipulated by the same or different manipulation
parameter. Specifically, we examined pairs of image patches
that had been resized by the same scaling factor or that had
been resized by different scaling factors, including “unknown”
scaling factors that were not used during training. This type
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Patch 2 Resizing Factor
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
Pa
tc
h 
1 
Re
siz
in
g 
Fa
ct
or
0.98 0.044 0.11 0.91 0.99 1 0.96 0.99 0.99 1
0.96 0.055 0.84 0.98 1 0.95 1 0.99 0.99
0.92 0.76 0.98 1 0.91 1 0.99 0.99
0.96 1 0.99 0.77 0.98 0.98 0.99
0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
0.98 0.67 0.99 1 1
0.78 0.42 0.61 0.99
0.99 0.12 0.99
0.91 0.67
0.99
Fig. 9. Correct comparison rates for comparing the resizing parameter in two
image patches. Unknown scaling factors are {0.8, 1.2, 1.4}. Blue highlights
one patch with unknown scaling factor, red highlights both patches have
unknown scaling factors.
of analysis is important when analyzing spliced images where
both the host image and foreign content were resized, but the
foreign content was resized by a different factor.
To do this, we started with the training database of image
patch pairs. We then resized each patch with one of the seven
“known” resizing factors in {0.6, 0.7, 0.9, None, 1.1, 1.3, 1.5}
using bilinear interpolation. We resized 50% of the image
patch pairs with the same scaling factor, and resized 50%
of the pairs with different scaling factors. We repeated this
for the evaluation database, using both the “known” scaling
factors and “unknown” scaling factors in {0.8, 1.2, 1.4}. We
then performed Learning Phase B using the training database
of resized image patches, with labels corresponding to whether
each pair of image patches was resized by the same or different
scaling factor.
The correct classification rates of our proposed approach
are shown in Fig. 9, broken down by tested resizing factor
pairings. For example, when one image patch was resized by a
factor of 0.8 and the other image patch was resized by a factor
of 1.4, both unknown scaling factors, our proposed system
correctly identified that the image patches were resized by
different scaling factors at rate of 99%. Cases where at least
one patch has been resized with an unknown scaling factor
are highlighted in blue. Cases where both patches have been
resized with an unknown scaling factor our outlined in red.
Our system achieved greater than 90% correct classification
rates in 33 of 45 tested scaling factor pairings. There are
also some cases where our proposed system does not achieve
high accuracy. These cases tend to occur when presented with
image patches that have been resized with different but similar
resizing factors. For example, when resizing factors of 1.4 and
1.3 are used, the system correctly identifies the scaling factor
as different 12% of the time.
The results of this experiment show that our proposed
approach is effective at comparing the manipulation parameter
in two image patches, a third type of forensic trace. This exper-
iment shows that our proposed approach is effective even when
one or both image patches have been manipulated by an un-
known parameter of the editing operation not used in training.
V. PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS
The forensic similarity approach is a versatile technique
that is useful in many different practical applications. In this
section, we demonstrate how a forensic similarity is used in
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two types of forensic investigations: image forgery detection
and localization, and image database consistency verification.
A. Forgery Detection and Localization
Here we demonstrate the utility of our proposed forensic
similarity system in the important forensic analysis of forged
images. In forged images, an image is altered to change its per-
ceived meaning. This can be done by inserting foreign content
from another image, called splicing, or by locally manipulating
a part of the image. Forging an image inherently introduces a
localized inconsistency of the forensic traces in the image.
In this section, we conducted two experiments that
demonstrate the power of our proposed similarity system for
detection of forged images and localization of the tampered
region. The proposed similarity system detects and localizes
the forged region of an image by exposing that it has a
different forensic trace than the rest of the image. In the
first experiment, we propose a simple forgery detection
criterion, evaluate its performance on three publicly available
datasets, and compare against state-of-the-art forgery detection
methods. In the second experiment, we show that our proposed
forensic system is effective for localizing tampering in “in-
the-wild” forged images, which are visually realistic and have
been downloaded from a popular social media website.
To detect image forgeries, we started with three publicly
available datasets. These datasets are the Columbia [37],
Carvalho [38], and the Korus et al. “realistic-tampering” [39]
datasets, which consist of tampered and unaltered images.
For each image in the dataset, subdivided it into blocks of
size 128×128 with 50% overlap in each dimension. For an
image with N blocks, we calculated the camera-model based
forensic similarity between each of N2 patch pairings. We
then calculated the mean similarity,
m =
1
N2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
S(Xi, Xj), (9)
where Xi is the ith sampled block in the image, and S(·, ·)
is the camera-model based similarity score from Eq. (4). This
mean similarity score is then compared to a threshold, with
high values indicating no tampering occurred since all patches
are expected to have high similarity with each other.
Table VI shows the mean average precision for forgery
detection for each dataset, with comparisons to the results
achieved by the methods proposed by Huh et al. [21], and
Bondi et al. [18]. The Huh et al. method works by generating a
“self-consistency map” of an image, and comparing the spatial
average of the consistency map to a threshold. The Bondi et
al. method works by generating a authenticity membership
map based on camera-model based feature representations,
and comparing the spatial average of this membership map
to a threshold. For [18], we use recommended settings of
Γdist = 0.9 and Γconf = 0.6, and vary Γdet.
For all three datasets, our proposed approach outperformed
the Bondi et al. method and the camera-model based version
of the Huh et al. method. The mean forensic similarity method
achieved “Area Under the Curve” (AUC) scores of 0.95
on [37], 0.91 on [38], and 0.59 on [39]. There are many
potential sources of these improvements, including the high
TABLE VI
FORGERY DETECTION MEAN AVERAGE PRECISION
Method Columbia [37] Carvalho [38] Korus [39]
Bondi et al. [18] 0.70 0.76 0.53
Huh et al. Camera [21] 0.70 0.73 0.15
Huh et al. Image [21] 0.97 0.75 0.58
Huh et al. EXIF [21] 0.98 0.87 0.55
Mean Forensic Similarity 0.95 0.91 0.60
performance of the proposed forensic similarity measurement,
as well as differences in training data, patch size, sampling
methods, and detection criteria.
Huh et al. found that training on additional information
contained in the image EXIF metadata, improved performance
over only camera-model information. Still, our proposed mean
camera-model based forensic similarity outperformed the Huh
et al. “EXIF” approach in the two more challenging Carvalho
and Korus datasets. This results suggests that performance
may be further increased by augmenting training information
to include similar EXIF-based information. This experiment
demonstrates the potential power of the proposed Forensic
Similarity approach for forgery detection.
In a second experiment, we demonstrate potential for
forgery localization on three forged images that were down-
loaded from www.reddit.com, for which we also have access
to the original version. First, we subdivided each forged image
into image patches with 50% overlap. Next, we selected one
image patch as a reference patch and calculated the similarity
score to all other image patches in the image. We used the sim-
ilarity system trained in Sec. IV-A to determine whether two
image patches were captured by the same or different camera
model with secondary JPEG compression. We then highlighted
the image patches with similarity scores less than a threshold,
i.e. contain a different forensic trace than the reference patch.
Results from this procedure on the first forged image are
shown in Fig. 10. The original image is shown in Fig. 10a.
The spliced version is shown Fig. 10b, where an actor
was spliced into the image. When we selected a reference
patch from the host (original) part of the image, the image
patches in the spliced regions were highlighted as forensically
different as shown in Fig. 10c. We note that our forensic
similarity based approach is agnostic to which regions are
forged and which are authentic, just that they have different
forensic signatures. This is seen in Fig. 10d when we selected
a spliced image patch as the reference patch. Fig. 10e shows
then when we performed this analysis on the original image,
our forensic similarity system does not find any forensically
different patches from the reference patch.
The second row of Fig. 10 shows forensic similarity analysis
using networks trained under different scenarios. Results using
the network trained to determine whether two image patches
have the same or different source camera model without
JPEG post-compression are shown in Fig. 10f for patch size
256×256, in Fig. 10g for patch size 128×128, and with JPEG
post-compression in Fig. 10h for patch size 128×128. The
result using the network trained to determine whether two
image patches have been manipulated by the same or different
manipulation type is shown in Fig. 10i.
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(a) Original (b) Spliced (c) Host reference (d) Spliced reference (e) Host ref, original image
(f) Cam. traces 256x256 (g) Cam. traces 128x128 (h) Cam. + JPG traces, 128x128 (i) Manip. traces, 256x256
Fig. 10. Splicing detection and localization example. The green box outlines a reference patch. Patches, spanning the image with 50% overlap, that are
detected as forensically different from the reference patch are highlighted in red. Image downloaded from www.reddit.com.
(a) Spliced Image (b) Host reference, 256x256 (c) Host reference, 128x128
Fig. 11. Splicing detection and localization example. The green box outlines a reference patch. Patches, spanning the image with 50% overlap, that are
detected as forensically different from the reference patch are highlighted in red.
(a) Original (b) Manipulated (c) Host reference (d) Host reference, 128x128
Fig. 12. Manipulation detection and localization example. The green box outlines a reference patch. Patches, spanning the image with 50% overlap, that are
detected as forensically different from the reference patch are highlighted in red.
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TABLE VII
RATES OF CORRECTLY IDENTIFYING A DATABASE AS “CONSISTENT” (I.E.
ALL THE SAME CAMERA MODEL) OR “INCONSISTENT,” M=10, N=20
Recompression threshold Type 0 Type 1 Type 2
None 0.1 97.4% 84.8% 100%
0.5 92.4% 91.9% 100%
0.9 70.7% 96.7% 100%
QF=75 0.1 99.2% 18.5% 92.2%
0.5 75.9% 75.5% 100%
0.9 00.2% 100% 100%
Results from splicing detection and localization procedure
on a second forged image are shown in Fig. 11, where a set of
toys were spliced into an image of a meeting of government
officials. When we selected reference patches from the host
image, the spliced areas were correctly identified as containing
a different forensic traces, exposing the image as forged. This
is seen in Fig. 11b with 256×256 patches, and in Fig. 11c
with 128×128 patches. The 128×128 case showed better
localization of the spliced region and additionally identified the
yellow airplanes as different than the host image, which were
not identified by the similarity system using larger patch sizes.
In a final example, shown in Fig. 12, the raindrop stains on a
mans shirt were edited out the image by a forger using a brush
tool. When we selected a reference patch from the unedited
part of the image, the manipulated regions were identified
as forensically different, exposing the tampered region of the
image. This is seen in Fig. 12c with 256×256 patches, and
in Fig. 12d with 128×128 patches. In the 128×128 case, the
smaller patch size was able to correctly expose that the man’s
shirt sleeve was also edited.
The result in Fig. 12 is particularly interesting since the
image has been modified by a brushing operation, yet it is
being detected by a network trained for comparisons of source
camera model. Research in [23] showed that forensic features
learned for camera model identification can be used to detect
different manipulations with high accuracy. Furthermore, re-
sults in [20] showed that their forgery localization technique
trained with camera model features was able to localize in-
painting manipulations. These results suggest that the forensic
traces induced by the source camera model and forensic traces
induced by manipulations are related, which is corroborated
by our result in Fig. 12.
The experiments in this section show that the proposed
forensic similarity based approach is a powerful technique for
detection and localization of image forgeries. The experiments
showed that correctly identifying differences in forensic traces
was sufficient to expose the forgery and forgery locations, even
though the technique did not identify the particular forensic
traces in the image.
B. Database Consistency Verification
In this section, we demonstrate that the forensic similarity
system detects whether a database of images has either been
captured by all the same camera model, or by different camera
models. This is an important task for social media websites,
where some accounts illicitly steal copyrighted content from
many different sources. We refer to these accounts as “content
aggregators”, who upload images captured by many different
camera models. This type of account contrasts with “content
generator” accounts, who upload images captured by one cam-
era model. In this experiment, we show how forensic similarity
is used to differentiate between these types of accounts.
To do this, we generated three types of databases of images.
Each database contained M images and were assigned to one
of three “Types.” Type 0 databases contained M images taken
by the same camera model, i.e. a content generator database.
Type 1 databases contained M−1 images taken by one camera
model, and 1 image taken by a different camera model. Finally,
Type 2 databases contain M images, each taken by different
camera models. We consider the Type 1 case the hardest to
differentiate from a Type 0 database, whereas the Type 2 case
is the easiest to detect. We created 1000 of each database
type from images captured by camera models in set C, i.e.
unknown camera models not used in training, with the camera
models randomly chosen for each database. We then created
duplicate versions of these databases, where each image is re-
compressed with a JPEG quality factor of 75. This was done to
mimic conditions similar to images on social media websites.
To classify a database as consistent or inconsistent, we
examined each
(
M
2
)
unique image pairings of the database.
For each image pair, we randomly selected N 256×256 image
patches from each image and calculated the N2 similarity
scores across the two images. Similarity was calculated us-
ing the similarity network trained in Sec. IV-A. Then, we
calculated the median value of scores for each whole-image
pair. For image pairs captured by the same camera model this
value is high, and for two images captured by different camera
models this value is low. We then compare the (M − 2)th
lowest value calculated from the entire database to a threshold.
If this (M − 2)th lowest value is above the threshold, we
consider the database to be consistent, i.e. from a content
generator. If this value is below the threshold, then we consider
the database to be inconsistent, i.e. from a content aggregator.
Table VII shows the rates at which we correctly classify
Type 0 databases as “consistent” (i.e. all from the same camera
model) and Type 1 and Type 2 databases as “inconsistent”,
with M = 10 images per database, and N = 20 patches
chosen from each image. Under the no re-compression case
and at a threshold of 0.5, we correctly classified 92.4% of Type
0 databases as consistent, and correctly classified 91.9% of
Type 1 databases as inconsistent. This incorrect classification
rate of Type 1 databases is decreased by increasing the
threshold. Even at a very low threshold of 0.1, our system
correctly identified all Type 2 databases as inconsistent.
Under the case where all images have undergone JPEG re-
compression, and at a threshold of 0.5, we correctly classified
75.9% of Type 0 databases as consistent, correctly classified
75.5% of Type 1 databases as inconsistent, and correctly
classified 100% of Type 2 databases as inconsistent.
The results of this experiment show that our proposed
forensic similarity system is effective for verifying the con-
sistency of an image database, an important type of forensic
investigation. Importantly, the forensic similarity system was
effective for evaluating consistency of databases captured by
camera models not used to train the system.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed a new digital image forensics
technique, called forensic similarity, which determines whether
two image patches contain the same or different forensic
traces. The main benefit of this approach is that prior knowl-
edge, e.g. training samples, of a forensic trace are not required
to make a forensic similarity decision on it. To do this, we pro-
posed a two part deep-learning system composed of a CNN-
based feature extractor and a three-layer neural network, called
the similarity network, which maps pairs of image patches onto
a score indicating whether they contain the same or different
forensic traces. We experimentally evaluated the performance
of our approach on three types of common forensic scenarios,
which showed that our proposed system was accurate in a
variety of settings. Importantly, the experiments showed this
system is accurate even on “unknown” forensic traces that
were not used to train the system and that our proposed
system significantly improved upon prior art in [22], reducing
error rates by over 50%. Furthermore, we demonstrated the
utility of the forensic similarity approach in two practical
applications of forgery detection and localization, and image
database consistency verification.
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